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Case Comment
ANTITRUST: BROADENING OF STANDING
IN PRIVATE LITIGATION UNDER
MALAMUD V. SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION*
INTRODUCTION
Private suits in federal antitrust litigation are authorized by
Section 4 of the Clayton Act.' This statutory provision sets forth
two prerequisites.' First, there must be an injury to the plain-
tiff's business or property. Second, the injury must be caused by
the defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. While congres-
sional intent' mandates a liberal interpretation of this section,
lower courts have limited the application of Section 4 to deny
plaintiffs access to the courts.' The limitation on the potential
*Carol Ann Petren, candidate for degree of Juris Doctor at Valparaiso
University School of Law.
1. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The entire provision is as
follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any
district court of the United States in the district in which the de-
fendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.
2. Id.
3. Congress apparently intended a liberal interpretation of the antitrust
laws since,
the purposes of the antitrust laws are better served by insuring that
the private action will be an ever-present threat to deter anyone con-
templating business behavior in violation of the antitrust laws ....
(T]he law encourages his suit to further the overriding public policy
in favor of competition.
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139
(1968); See FTC v. Meyer, 390 U.S. 341 (1968); Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311 (1965); Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957); Lawlor v. National Screen
Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955); Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp.,
221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955); cf. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California,
395 U.S. 642 (1969).
4. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910), first intro-
duced the concept of "direct injury." Since Loeb, some courts have expanded
the "direct injury" test into what is labeled the "target area" doctrine. See
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955).
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number of antitrust litigants has been accomplished by creating
a myriad of analytical techniques in defining "by reason of,"5 the
statutory provision for causation. Judicial interpretation has
superimposed the requirement that in order for a plaintiff to
have standing, his loss must have been the result of a "direct
injury,"6 by the defendant, or he must have been within the "tar-
get area"" of the antitrust violation.'
However, in a recent decision, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to apply such judicial limitations traditionally
imposed on private antitrust standing. Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corporation9 adopted the liberal Supreme Court standing test ar-
ticulated in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp.' The two-pronged analysis of Data Processing re-
quires, first, that a plaintiff allege an injury in fact, and second,
that the interest sought to be protected by the plaintiff be argu-
ably within the zone of interest to be protected by the statute in
question." In practical effect, this test commands a liberal ap-
plication of the standing prerequisites of Section 4 of the Clay-
ton Act.
The scope of this comment is confined to the causation ele-
ment of private antitrust standing. First, an historical analysis
of antitrust standing will be presented, with specific emphasis
upon the language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme
5. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). This section is quoted in its entirety in note
1, supra.
6. See note 27 infra and accompanying text.
7. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
8. Although it is not at issue in Malamud, courts have also construed
the first requirement, that of injury, to exact a showing of certainty. Rather
than allowing minimal factual allegations to suffice for purposes of injury,
courts have demanded that the pleading demonstrate with certainty that the
complainant has in fact suffered legal injury. Story Parchment Co. v. Pater-
son Co., 282 U.S. 555, 562 (1931); Terrell v. Household Goods Carriers'
Bureau, 494 F.2d 16, 20 (5th Cir. 1974).
9. 521 F.2d1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
10. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Although the Data Processing test was de-
veloped for use in administrative law, the court in Malamud found it to be
applicable to standing in antitrust litigation:
Because a private action under Section 4 has some considerable en-
forcement value, it is in the nature of a public suit. As with a suit
in the administrative law field, a private antitrust claim seeks both
to remedy the alleged injury to the private plaintiff and to "vindi-
cate the important public interest in free competition."
521 F.2d at 1151.
11. 397 U.S. at 152-53.
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Court's interpretation of the Act, and the lower courts' traditional
restrictions on standing. The second part of the comment will be
addressed to the application of the Data Processing test and its
probable impact on antitrust standing.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST STANDING
Broad Language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act
Section 4 of the Clayton Act gives private parties standing
to bring treble damage actions for injuries sustained by reason
of the anti-competitive activities of others. An examination of
the language of the Act evidences the congressional intention to
grant relief to an expansive array of litigants. In relevant part,
the Act states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or prop-
erty by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefor ... without respect to the amount
in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.'2
Under Section 4, there exists the requirement that a plaintiff
establish a causal nexus between the injury sustained and the
defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. The plain language
of the Act would seem to require no more than a finding of
causation in accordance with the typical "cause in fact" test;
there is no additional statutory language exacting a greater show-
ing of causation as a condition precedent to standing.
The contention that such a liberal grant of standing was in-
tended by Congress is further supported by the purpose of the
Clayton Act. The treble damage action was created to facilitate
private litigation in an effort to deter economic abuses. 3 Four
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
13. The purpose of the Clayton Act was defined by Congress:
[I~t was believed that the most effective method [of enforcing the
antitrust laws], in addition to the imposition of penalties by the
United States, was to provide for private treble damage suits. It
was originally hoped that this would encourage private litigants to
bear a considerable amount of the burden and expense of enforce-
ment and thus save the Government time and money.
S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. at 2 (1955). See REPORT OF THE ATToR-
NEY GENERAL'S NAT'L COMM. TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 378 (1955).
See also Maltz v. Sax, 134 F.2d 2, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 319 U.S. 772
(1943) ;Fanchon & Marco v. Paramount Pictures, 100 F. Supp. 84, 88 (S.D.
1976] •
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significant inducements are provided for private enforcement:
(1) the absence of a jurisdictional amount as a condition prece-
dent to bringing suit; (2) the provision for treble damages;
(3) the recovery of the cost of suit and (4) a reasonable attor-
ney's fee.' As stated by the court in Malamud v. Sinclair Oil
Corporation:
This broad remedial statute which is available to pri-
vate persons is an integral part of the enforcement
scheme of the federal antitrust laws. . . . By providing
sufficient incentive to private plaintiffs to file suit for
alleged violations of the antitrust laws, Section 4 serves
as an additional deterrent supplementing the govern-
ment's enforcement of these same statutes. 5
A restrictive interpretation of the statute is unresponsive to
the needs enunciated by Congress--the need for a free and com-
petitive economy."6
Interpretation of Section 4 of the Clayton Act by the Supreme Court
In furtherance of Congressional intent, the Supreme Court
has consistently refused to burden the antitrust litigant with
standing requirements in addition to those delineated in Section 4
of the Clayton Act. Malamud stresses the decision in Radovich
v. National Football League" wherein the Supreme Court spe-
Cal. 1951), aff'd, 215 F.2d 167 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 912
(1955); Weinberg v. Sinclair Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D.N.Y.
1942).
14. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). In Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co.,
330 U.S. 743 (1947), the Supreme Court stated:
It is clear that Congress intended to use private self-interest as a
means of enforcement and to arm injured persons with private means
to retribution when it gave to any injured party a private cause of
action in which his damages are to be made good threefold, with costs
of suit and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id. at 751-52. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 342 U.S.
134, 147 (1968); Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392
U.S. 134, 138-40 (1968); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood
Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311, 318 (1965); Emich Motors Corp. v. General
Motors Corp., 340 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1951).
15. 521 F.2d at 1147-48.
16. Lawlor v. National Screen Service, 349 U.S. 322 (1955); United
States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514 (1954); United States v. National City
Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948); Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940);
Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d (9th Cir. 1955); Maltz v. Sax,
134 F.2d 2 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 772 (1943); Weinberg v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 48 F. Supp. 203 (E.D.N.Y. 1942).
17. 352 U.S. 445 (1947).
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cifically stated: "Congress itself has placed the private litigant
in a most favorable position and this Court should not add re-
quirements to burden what is specifically set forth by Congress."'
After many lower courts"' imposed some restrictions on the causa-
tion requisite to standing, the Supreme Court reiterated its posi-
tion that the Clayton Act should be broadly defined: "The Act is
comprehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are
made victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may
be perpetrated."2
The Supreme Court has noted that lower courts have at-
tempted to limit the class of prospective antitrust litigants.2' The
Court's recognition of these limitations may be construed to give
implicit approval of the restrictive trend of antitrust standing.
Justice Brennan, however, views private litigants as "primary
enforcers of antitrust policy armed with the weapon of triple re-
covery as a means of stimulating their efforts."22 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has never expressly accepted lower court re-
strictions on private antitrust standing. Nonetheless, the courts
18. Id. at 454.
19. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text.
20. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
21. In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (1972),
Justice Marshall remarked:
The lower courts have been virtually unanimous in concluding that
Congress did not intend the antitrust laws to provide a remedy in
damages for all injuries that might conceivably be traced to an anti-
trust violation.
Id. at 263 n.14.
22. Id. at 276.
23. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642 (1969), was
a price discrimination case in which the plaintiff claimed injuries sustained
by reason of price differences between gasoline sold to him and that sold to
Signal Oil Company which in turn sold the gasoline to Regal Stations Com-
pany-a competitor of Perkins. The plaintiff's claim against Standard Oil
was denied on the basis that Regal was "too far removed" from Standard in
the chain of distribution. The court of appeals also relied on Karseal Corp. v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1955), in holding that certain
damages individually awarded Perkins were not proximately caused by the
defendant's violation. It was reasoned that Perkins was not aimed at, and
therefore, could not recover. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the
injured party must show a causal connection between the discrimination and
the injury but refused to apply any standard whereby "links in a distribu-
tion chain" would operate to deny a plaintiff standing. In practical effect
the "direct injury" analysis was thereby undermined. Although the "target
area" test was not explicitly rejected, the Court concluded that "Perkins was
no mere innocent bystander; he was the principal victim of the price dis-
1976]
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of appeals have persisted in restricting standing in private anti-
trust suits."
Restrictions on Private Antitrust Standing by the Lower Courts
As recognized by Malamud,5 the effects of Section 4 have
been improperly limited by employing the standing doctrine as a
screening device to deny plaintiffs access to the courts. This has
been accomplished by narrow judicial construction of the key
phrase "by reason of"" 6-the causation provision of standing under
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. Two major limiting interpretations-
the "direct injury"2 and "target area"28 tests--emerge from an
analysis of lower court decisions. Interestingly, neither the plain
language of Section 4 nor Supreme Court decisions lend support
to either of these doctrines.
crimination... and was directly injured .... " Id. at 649. It can be argued
that the Supreme Court views with disfavor any restriction being placed on
the "by reason" clause of Section 4 of the Clayton Act.
24. See notes 28-29 infra and accompanying text.
25. 521 F.2d at 1148.
26. See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
27. The "direct injury" test has resulted in denial of standing to officers
and employees of a corporation who allege illegal restraints directly injuring
the corporate employer. Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973). A lessor is denied standing where
the direct injury is to the lessee. Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 234 F.2d
518 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956). Comparable logic bars a
franchisor from suing where it is the franchisee who is directly injured.
Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971); cf. Nationwide Auto Appraisers Service v. Association
of Causualty & Surety Co., 382 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1967).
28. Initiated by the Ninth Circuit in the case of Conference of Studio
Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 919
(1952), the "target area" doctrine emphasizes the economic area threatened
by the antitrust violation. The actual impact of this approach became ap-
parent with the decision in Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d
358 (9th Cir. 1955). The plaintiff in this later case manufactured automo-
bile waxes which were sold to independent service stations for retail sale.
The defendant, a producer of petroleum products, entered into sales contracts
with service stations providing for exclusive dealing in automotive acces-
sories. The court held that the manufacturer had standing to sue the defen-
dant distributor although the manufacturer's own distributors were the par-
ties in direct competition with the defendant and those immediately injured.
The illegal practices effected a restraint upon the sale of a particular product.
Since the violation was aimed at hindering the sale of such products, the
manufacturers, suppliers, and distributors of those products were all the
"target" of the defendant's violation. See also Calderone Enterprises Corp.
v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972); Sanitary Milk Producers v. Bergjans Farm
Dairy, Inc., 368 F.2d 679 (8th Cir. 1966).
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First enunciated in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Company,29 the
"direct injury" test emphasizes the relationship between the claim-
ant and the alleged antitrust violator. Simply stated, one of two
conditions must be present for the private antitrust litigant to
have standing under this test. Either the plaintiff must be in
privity of contract with the defendant, or the plaintiff must be
a competitor of the defendant unseparated by an intermediary
party. To eliminate the possibility of duplicate recoveries, the
lower courts have construed the doctrine to bar standing to sue
for derivative injury, reasoning that the intermediary would be
the proper party to sue for the purported violation."
These stringent constraints engendered by the "direct injury"
analysis have encountered much criticism during the past two
decades. Courts have recognized that in many cases, standing
has been unjustly denied to deserving plaintiffs although actual
injury was not in dispute." Requiring privity as an element of
causation has had the logical effect of prohibiting all foreclosure
suits. If he is foreclosed from a particular market, the plaintiff
in question has been refused the opportunity of establishing priv-
ity with the antitrust violator. As a result, a plaintiff who is
foreclosed from a market is denied the possibility of recovery for
damages caused by a defendant's prohibitive actions in violation
of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has im-
plicitly undermined the "direct injury" test, reasoning that:
29. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
30. The court in Ames v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820, 823
(C.C.D. Mass. 1909), suggested the possibility of "sextuple damages" for
the same unlawful act if stockholders of injured corporations could maintain
treble damage actions. In Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F. 704, 709 (3d
Cir. 1910), the court concluded that the damages, if any, should be recovered
through the party which had been directly injured.
31. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the "direct injury"
analysis in the case of In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No.
31, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973). The court
reasoned:
Resurrecting notions of privity, [the "direct injury"] test arbitrarily
forecloses otherwise meritorious claims simply because another anti-
trust victim interfaces the relationship between the claimant and the
alleged violator. Moreover, the "direct injury" requirement has en-
gendered among some adherents a regrettable tendency to deny
standing to any plaintiff who happens to fall within certain talis-
manic rubrics: "creditor," "landlord," "lessor," "franchisor," "sup-
plier." This disposition is, we think, unsatisfactory insofar as it
transforms judicial inquiry into a mere search for labels.
Id. at 127.
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[TIhe competitive harm done... is certainly no less be-
cause of the presence of an additional link in the par-
ticular distribution chain .... [W]e do not accept such
an artificial limitation.2
In contrast to the "direct injury" test, the "target area" test
focuses on the economic area threatened by the antitrust viola-
tion.3 Two questions arise in analyzing the relationship of the
claimant to the area of the economy endangered by a breakdown
of competitive conditions. First, what is the area of the economy
affected by the antitrust violation? Second, is the plaintiff's busi-
ness or property within the area of the economy so affected? If
the plaintiff's business or property comes within the affected
area, the causal nexus has been established.
The "target area" analysis, however, has proven to be con-
ceptually difficult to apply. A number of courts have manipulated
the test by defining the target as the area of the economy aimed
at by the alleged violator,3" thus severely limiting the number of
private antitrust litigants. Other jurisdictions have liberalized
the test by using a foreseeability approach in defining the area
of the economy affected by the antitrust violation.3 Such a mea-
sure is overbroad as well as ambiguous. The net effect of this
difficulty is to prevent litigation, contrary to the intent of Con-
gress that antitrust laws be stringently enforced.3" Yet, it is cru-
cial for a complete understanding of antitrust standing to be cog-
nizant of the policies which can militate against recovery for all
injuries traced to an antitrust violation.
Construction of the Language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act: Two
Competing Policies
There exists an inherent conflict in antitrust laws between
the policy of enforcement achieved by a broad grant of standing,
and the need to eliminate spurious claims lured by the possibility
32. Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969).
33. See note 28 supra.
34. Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prod-
ucts Corp., 224 F.2d 678 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 936 (1956).
35. Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions, 433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971); Hoopes v. Union Oil Company of
California, 374 F.2d 480 (9th Cir. 1967); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. 1964).
36. See note 3 supra.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2 [1976], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss2/7
ANTITRUST STANDING
of a treble damage windfall." Numerous provisions of the Clay-
ton Act create incentives for the private person to bring antitrust
suits which have the effect of deterring violations and preserving
the free market.3" On the other hand, the courts' reluctance to
grant standing may be attributable to the magnitude of the treble
damage recovery. 9 Only one-third of such recovery is compen-
satory, while the final two-thirds is typically viewed as pure
windfall.
In actuality, however, the courts have over-estimated the
amount of windfall recoverable. A recovery of treble damages is
not as lucrative in fact as it first appears in theory. In computing
damages, the time interval between the date of injury and the
date on which damages are awarded is not included. There is no
compensation for the loss of purchasing power and interest dur-
ing those interval years.4 ' Thus, it is simply not accurate to say
that two-thirds of the recovery is totally windfall. Therefore, the
fear of spurious claims motivated by the lure of treble damage
windfall is not a totally convincing reason to limit standing.
THE FACTUAL CONTEXT IN Malamud v. Sinclair
Oil Corporation
The Sixth Circuit reconciled the competing antitrust policy
considerations by employing the Data Processing test in Malamud
v. Sinclair Oil Corporation.2 The antitrust action in Malamud
was instituted against Sinclair Oil for alleged violation of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.4 3
37. 'Melrose Realty Co. v. Loew's, Inc. 234 F.2d 518 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 890 (1956); Peller v. International Boxing Club, Inc., 227
F.2d 593 (7th Cir. 1955).
38. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
39. When construing and applying statutes, the Supreme Court has
always been vigilant in requiring courts to consider "economic reality." United
States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n., 393 U.S. 199, 208 (1968).
Analysis of the economic realities of antitrust suits has invariably led to the
conclusion that treble damages is a very drastic remedy. Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Image and Sound Service Corp. v. Altec
Service Corp., 148 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D. Mass. 1956).
40. As stated in Stigler, et al., Report of the Task Force on Productivity
and Competition, 2 ANTITRUST L. AND ECON. Rav. 13, 34 (1969), "the ex-
cess over actual damage and costs represents a pure windfall to the private
plaintiff."
41. Parker, The Deterrent Effect of Private Treble Damage Suits: Fact
or Fantasy, 3 N.M.L. REv. 286, 288-90 (1973).
42. 521 F.2d 1142, 1144-45.
43. Id. at 1144.
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For purposes of clarity, the plaintiffs are designated as follows:
Jack and Anne Malamud (the officers, directors, and sole share-
holders of the four remaining corporate plaintiffs) ; Malco Petro-
leum, Inc. (the petroleum distribution company); Brentwood Cor-
poration, Malco Corporation, and Tobyneil Corporation (the three
real estate investment companies).
In 1965, Sinclair and Malco Petroleum, Inc. executed a dis-
tribution agreement wherein Sinclair agreed to supply gasoline
and other products to Malco and to financially assist the invest-
ment companies in acquiring new service stations. Upon Sinclair's
subsequent refusal to assist the investment companies in any of
their ventures, Jack Malamud negotiated a distribution agreement
with Texaco, Inc., which was signed in August, 1966. Malamud,
on behalf of Malco Petroleum, also unsuccessfully sought an early
termination of the distribution contract with Sinclair. Due to
Sinclair's refusal to permit an early termination of the contract
and because of its failure to provide financing for expansion, the
plaintiffs sued for antitrust violations, claiming substantial dam-
age from lost profits by reason of unrealized sales growth. All of
the plaintiffs except Malco also claimed damage from unrealized
growth in real estate equity ownership."'
In a motion for reconsideration of the district court's de-
nial of summary judgment, Sinclair argued that all the plaintiffs
lacked standing since none of them had been directly injured."'
The district court rejected this contention, holding that all the
plaintiffs had standing as defined in Data Processing.'" However,
relying on one of its past decisions,"' the district court also found
that, as a matter of law, neither the individual plaintiffs nor the
distributorship could possibly establish a sufficiently direct in-
jury.48 The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's recogni-
tion of standing as to the investment firms.'9 However, the ap-
pellate court rejected the "direct injury" and "target area" tests
as applied by the lower court in limiting standing." Reasoning
44. Id. at 1145.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Volasco Products Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963). The sole suppliers of raw
materials to direct victims of defendant-competitor were prevented from suing
for losses they sustained through decreased sales, since they were too far
removed from the direct injury allegedly aimed at the suppliers' customers.
48. 521 F.2d at 1145.
49. Id. at 1146.
50. Id. at 1149.
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that both doctrines are too demanding at the pleading stage, the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals viewed the Data Processing test
as the proper standard for a determination of standing in private
antitrust action."
Malamud TEST FOR STANDING
Significantly, Malamud was the first court to apply the Data
Processing test to standing in private antitrust action. The first
criterion of the two-pronged test is "whether the plaintiff alleges
that the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic
or otherwise." 2 In Malamud, the investment companies claimed
an inability to expand their operations due to Sinclair's failure to
provide financial assistance as agreed in the contract. This alle-
gation satisfied the threshold requirement of standing."3 Although
the district court's dismissal of the claim of the individual plain-
tiffs and of the distributorship was not before the court on ap-
peal, their averments of damage would also clearly sustain an
allegation of injury, since there need be no showing of a direct
injury as exacted under the "direct injury" and "target area"
doctrines. The only prerequisite for standing is an allegation of
injury by reason of the defendant's illegal practices.
The second criterion of Data Processing is "whether the in-
terest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."' In Malamud, the invest-
ment firms sought to protect the expansion of their business by
the acquisition and development of additional service station sites.
As a means to that end, the parties entered into a financing agree-
ment. The plaintiffs contended that Sinclair sought to maintain
the status quo for the marketing of petroleum products in the
area of distributorship, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman
Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act." Certainly the plaintiffs'
interest falls within the "zone of interests to be protected" by the
antitrust statutes. These laws seek to protect the competitive
economy from the effects of any combination of conspiracy in
restraint of trade. When these competitive conditions are inter-
fered with, as in Malamud, the force of the antitrust laws may
be invoked through the private treble damage action. Since both
51. I& at 1151.
52. 397 U.S. at 152.
53. 521 F.2d at 1151.
54. 397 U.S. at 153.
55. 521 F.2d at 1151.
1976] 395
Petren: Antitrust: Broadening of Standing in Private Litigation Under Mal
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1976
396 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10
requirements of the Data Processing test were satisfied, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the investment companies' standing to sue under
the antitrust laws.
56
After examining the "direct injury" and "target area" tests,
the Malamud court concluded that "both theories really demand
too much from the plaintiffs at the pleading stage of a case." '
The court noted that while the directness of an injury must be
determined upon a factual showing,
standing is a preliminary determination ordinarily to be
evaluated upon the allegations of the complaint. As a re-
sult, a party may make sufficient allegation to demon-
strate the necessary standing to sue but fail to prove his
case on the merits.5
Because the purpose of standing is to eliminate those plaintiffs
barred from suing by Article III of the Constitution,"' standing
must focus "on the party seeking to get his complaint before a
federal court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudi-
cated." ' The Malamud court found that this party was isolated
by the Clayton Act's Section 4 prerequisite: that the party sus-
tain injury by reason of the defendant's antitrust action.6 '
In the face of such a mandate, the lower courts have persisted
in employing the "direct injury" and "target area" standing doc-
trines in attempts to arrest litigation at an early stage. 2 Malamud
held that either approach enables the court to make a "determina-
tion on the merits of a claim under the guise of assessing the
standing of a claimant."'" Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals discarded the "direct injury" and "target area" ap-
proaches traditionally employed by the lower courts in antitrust
suits. Equally as important, the court adopted the Data Processing
test for antitrust standing determinations, requiring only that the
plaintiff allege that there was injury in fact, and that his in-
terest is arguably within the zone of interests protected by the
statutes."
56. Id. at 1152.
57. Id. at 1149.
58. Id. at 1150.
59. Id. at 1149.
60. Id. at 1147, citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1969).
61. Id. at 1148.
62. Id. at 1149-50.
63. Id. at 1150 (court's emphasis).
64. 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970).
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ANTITRUST STANDING
CONCLUSION
Despite the simple language of Section 4 of the Clayton Act
and the various decisions by the Supreme Court, the lower courts
have persisted in limiting standing in federal antitrust litigation.
Both the "direct injury" and "target area" doctrines employed by
the courts restrict private antitrust standing. Judicial interpreta-
tion of Section 4 has demanded that a plaintiff's loss must have
been the result of a "direct injury" by the defendant or that he
must have been within the "target area" of the antitrust violation.
Therefore, in addition to the requirement that a causal nexus be-
tween the injury sustained and the defendant's violation be alleged,
a plaintiff must also establish directness of injury. The resulting
limitation on the number of antitrust litigants contradicts the
primary purpose of the antitrust laws-preservation of a competi-
tive economy. That Congress intended to confer a liberal grant
of standing to further the competitive freedom of a market in
buying and selling products, is supported by the broad language
and the specific provisions of Section 4 and is buttressed by Su-
preme Court decisions and developing trends in case law."
Unlike the above tests, the "zone of interest" approach es-
poused by the Malamud court, comprehends the entire market
65. Id. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure abolished the
need for fact pleading. At that time, arguments for requiring special plead-
ing in antitrust cases were made. Yet, Congress created no special excep-
tion for antitrust suits under liberal notice pleading which provides the
framework for the Federal Rules. Nagler v. Admiral Corp., 248 F.2d 319
(2d Cir. 1957). In Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 47 (1957), the Supreme
Court held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claim-
ant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the con-
trary, the law requires "'a short and plain statement of the claim' that will
give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests." Id. at 47. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
In Hart v. B. F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271 (1923), Mr.
Justice Holmes defined the test for sufficiency of an antitrust complaint.
The court must determine whether "the claim is wholly frivolous." Id. at 274.
The Supreme Court has also warned that summary judgment "should be
used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation. . . ." Poller v. Columbia Broad-
casting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
66. Developing case law has also emphasized the need for a broad con-
struction of Section 4. Until recently, a plaintiff was burdened with proving
injury to the public. The Supreme Court's decision in Radovich v. National
Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957), removed this additional requirement
for standing, since public injury was judged immaterial to the plaintiffs'
complaint. Furthermore, the lower courts have shifted from the restrictive
"direct injury" test to a more flexible analysis of causation in the "target
area" approach.
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affected by antitrust violations. The policy underlying the anti-
trust laws is better achieved by a broadening of standing under
the Data Processing test. A more liberal application of Section 4
of the Clayton Act promotes this policy of exposing and deterring
anti-competitive practices while guarding against the prolifera-
tion of spurious claims. Also, as opposed to the restrictive nature
of the "direct injury" and "target area" test, the "zone of in-
terest" analysis permits a distinction between the determination
of a litigant's standing and a decision on the merits of his claim.
Although limitations on the plain language of Section 4 of the
Clayton Act are still present, the "zone of interest" approach ac-
commodates both competing policy concepts while conforming more
nearly to the Congressional intent expressed in the Act.
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